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Abstract It has been proposed that sudden insight into
the solutions of problems can enhance long-term memory
for those solutions. However, the nature of insight has been
operationalized differently across studies. Here, we exam-
ined two main aspects of insight problem-solving—the
generation of a solution and the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experi-
ence—and experimentally evaluated their respective rela-
tionships to long-term memory formation (encoding). Our
results suggest that generation (generated solution vs.
presented solution) and the ‘‘aha!’’ experience (‘‘aha!’’ vs.
no ‘‘aha!’’) are independently related to learning from
insight, as well as to the emotional response towards
understanding the solution during encoding. Moreover, we
analyzed the relationship between generation and the
‘‘aha!’’ experience and two different kinds of later memory
tests, direct (intentional) and indirect (incidental). Here, we
found that the generation effect was larger for indirect
testing, reflecting more automatic retrieval processes, while
the relationship with the occurrence of an ‘‘aha!’’ experi-
ence was somewhat larger for direct testing. Our results
suggest that both the generation of a solution and the
subjective experience of ‘‘aha!’’ indicate processes that
benefit long-term memory formation, though differently.
This beneficial effect is possibly due to the intrinsic reward
associated with sudden comprehension and the detection of
schema-consistency, i.e., that novel information can be
easily integrated into existing knowledge.
Introduction
Solving problems by insight has been proposed to be
beneficial to long-term memory (LTM) encoding (Auble,
Franks, & Soraci, 1979; Danek, Fraps, von Mu¨ller, Grothe,
& Ollinger, 2013; Ludmer, Dudai, & Rubin, 2011), a
proposal that could have considerable educational as well
as neuroscientific relevance. It would suggest that educa-
tors can optimize learning by actively creating situations
during which their students experience insight. Under-
standing the relevant cognitive processes could help
devising such educational strategies, in addition to
addressing the fundamental brain basis of learning and
memory. However, insight has been operationalized very
differently across studies (e.g., Auble et al., 1979; Bowden,
Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Kounios & Bee-
man, 2009; Ludmer et al., 2011). For example, Mednick
operationalized insight as solving a problem that requires
creativity (Mednick, 1962), whereby creativity was
understood as the process of searching successfully for a
unique common associate between a provided set of three
words that are only remotely associated by that word (e.g.,
cottage, blue, goat–cheese). If the words were already
closely associated, it would not require creativity to find
the missing link. Others have asserted that the presence of a
subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience is necessary to interpret a
solution to a problem as an insight (Bowden & Jung-
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Beeman, 2003a; Bowden et al., 2005; Danek et al., 2013).
In contrast to this definition, Mednick’s operationalization
is relatively more objective as the correctness of a solution
to a problem that has only one possible solution can be
judged by a third person. Again others required only a state
of previous incomprehension of the solution to a problem,
followed by a sudden change to a state of understanding the
solution, which could even be induced by presenting the
solution (Auble et al., 1979; Ludmer et al., 2011). Finally,
some researchers have proposed that insight does not
necessarily include a state of incomprehension, but needs
mental restructuring (Wills, Estow, Soraci, & Garcia,
2006), for which the common term in the insight literature
is a representational change of the problem/solution space
(Ohlsson, 1984; O¨llinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2013).
Therefore, it is difficult to say by what means insight
problem-solving may facilitate encoding.
In the current study, we are focusing on two aspects of
the different operationalizations of insight that may be
especially relevant to learning, but which are not used
consistently: generation, that is, whether the solution to an
insight problem is found by the participant or presented by
the experimenter, and the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience,1
which is a subjective feeling of comprehending the solution
suddenly while being convinced of its truth. We now
address these components in turn and explain their rele-
vance to learning.
The generation effect
The generation effect is the superiority of items that are
generated by participants over items that are presented to
them in regard to later LTM performance (Burns, 1992;
Slamecka & Fevreiski, 1983; Slamecka & Graf, 1978).
Generation may involve, for example, coming up with a
word associated to a cue word, completing a word stem,
solving an anagram, finding an antonym, or—in terms of
the question at hand—finding a solution to a problem in
contrast to being presented with the solution. It has been
consistently found that requiring generation, in comparison
to presenting the solution, leads to enhanced later long-
term memory as tested by recognition memory, cued recall,
and free recall (e.g., Burns, 1992; McNamara & Healy,
2000; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). In addition, this effect is
larger the longer the retention interval (for a summary and
overview, see the meta-analysis by Bertsch, Pesta, Wiscott,
& McDaniel, 2007). There have been several attempts to
explain the effect, the main hypotheses being (1) cognitive
effort, (2) transfer-appropriate processing, and (3) level of
processing (LOP).
The first explanation suggests higher cognitive effort
used to engage with the items in contrast to mere reading/
perceptual processing. However, in an extensive meta-
analysis, Bertsch et al. found no dependency on cognitive
effort, that is, task difficulty (Bertsch et al., 2007). The
second explanation, transfer-appropriate processing, refers
to the finding that memory performance is better, the closer
the processing required by the memory test corresponds to
the processing that occurred in the encoding phase. How-
ever, the evidence shows only partial support for this idea
(Bertsch et al., 2007). The third explanation, level of pro-
cessing, is probably the strongest so far, that is, that gen-
erating an item leads to a more elaborate semantic
processing of the item than reading the solution, thereby
enhancing memory (McElroy & Slamecka, 1982; Sla-
mecka & Graf, 1978). There is strong evidence that better
semantic integration for the generate condition is at the
core of the generation effect. When comparing words with
non-words in a generate and read condition, there is no
generation effect for non-words—not even when the gen-
eration rule is rhyming, that is, lexical-phonologic, or when
the target word to a non-word can be a word (McElroy &
Slamecka, 1982). This result suggests that the semantic
spreading activation of related concepts during generation
and a better integration of the generated items into existing
semantic networks is mostly responsible for the later
memory advantage (Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus,
1975).
The subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience
The ‘‘aha!’’ experience is defined as the sudden, unex-
pected comprehension of a solution to a problem that
comes with an ease of understanding the solution. It is
usually accompanied by a positive feeling that is not the
feeling of pride to have solved the item, because it comes
before the assessment of the solution. Moreover, there is
complete confidence in the truth of the solution (Topolinski
& Reber, 2010). The generation of a solution per se does
not necessarily provide any information about how par-
ticipants arrived at the solution, e.g., whether they arrived
at it via sudden insight, by means of a analytical problem-
solving approach, or otherwise—only if one assumes that a
problem is not solvable without insight (such as Mednick,
1962). We therefore investigated not only the relationship
between generating solutions to insight problems, but also
how generation relates to the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience,
1 It has to be noted that generation and the subjective ‘‘aha!’’
experience are not the only criteria that have been used to
operationalize insight. However, these are two criteria that may be
especially relevant to learning from insight and which we therefore
chose for further investigation. This was done without a specific
assumption of how these aspects contribute to the definition of
insight. Our interest was in how generation and the subjective ‘‘aha!’’
experience contribute to learning, not in their importance for the
definition of insight.
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and their possible interaction in regard to learning. Sur-
prisingly, none of the authors who have previously used the
subjectively reported ‘‘aha!’’ as a criterion for insight has
reported whether such ‘‘aha!’’ experiences may also be
reported when the solution is presented after a failed
attempt at problem-solving.
The ‘‘aha!’’ experience was coined by Bu¨hler (1907)
who referred to it as a sudden verbal-cognitive under-
standing of a foreign idea/sentence. Something novel is
learned by means of a complex interaction between one’s
declarative memory content and problem-solving processes
tackling the sentence. A more recent operationalization of
the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience was introduced by
Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003b). Before the experiment,
participants were provided with the following definition of
an ‘‘aha!’’ experience: ‘‘A feeling of insight is a kind of
‘Aha!’ characterized by suddenness and obviousness. You
may not be sure how you came up with the answer, but are
relatively confident that it is correct without having to
mentally check it. It is as though the answer came into
mind all at once—when you first thought of the word, you
simply knew it was the answer. This feeling does not have
to be overwhelming, but should resemble what was just
described’’. (p. 507, Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). During the
experiment, whenever the participants solved a problem,
they were asked whether they solved it with an ‘‘aha!’’
experience or not. The authors interpreted items being
solved without an ‘‘aha!’’ experience as being solved
analytically, that is, by means of applying known problem-
solving strategies and continuously getting closer to the
solution until it has been found.
However, whether such a clear-cut binary categorization
can be made is questionable. For example, Klein and Jarosz
(2011) investigated naturally occurring insights, by col-
lecting reports of such incidents in everyday life. They
observed that reaching an impasse occurred only in some
cases, although a change in understanding happened most
of the time and helped coming up with new ways to
approach solving the problem (representational change of
the problem/solution space). Moreover, insights were often
reached gradually: an intuitive feeling of coming closer to
the solution often preceded the insight for a long time.
During this time, inconsistencies with one’s own assump-
tions and with information that at first seemed coincidental
was gradually perceived to form a pattern that finally led to
the solution (Klein & Jarosz, 2011). They therefore pro-
posed that the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience might be an
epiphenomenon that accompanies some of the insight
solutions, probably those that are found after an impasse
has been suddenly overcome, but not all. On the other
hand, Bowers suggests that the intuitive feeling of getting
closer to the solution is due to automatic spreading acti-
vation from all known pieces of information to associated
semantic information that gradually form coherence which
at some point emerges into consciousness (Bowers,
Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990). This theory of insight
problem-solving does not necessitate impasse for the
‘‘aha!’’ experience which merely indicates the sudden
emergence into consciousness of a hypothesis about the
solution.
In the current study, we used a definition of the sub-
jective feeling of ‘‘aha!’’ that was based on the Bowden
and Jung-Beeman (2003a, b) definition, but changed it so
that the generation of a solution was not declared a nec-
essary precondition for ‘‘aha!’’. This way, subjects were
unbiased, therefore enabling us to test whether ‘‘aha!’’
experiences do indeed depend on generation. It should be
noted that we did not specify the occurrence of an impasse
or representational change as a defining criterion for the
subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience, because it is not clear whe-
ther it is necessary precondition as discussed above.
Moreover, we do not see no ‘‘aha!’’ as analytical problem-
solving but leave it undefined, as it is only clear that sub-
jects did not comprehend the solution in the specified way
for ‘‘aha!’’, but not by what means they reached an
understanding.
Insight and long-term memory encoding
We assume that insight can enhance LTM encoding (Auble
et al., 1979; Danek et al., 2013). There are several factors
that may lead to such a positive influence on memory
formation. First, generation can enhance LTM encoding for
an item although, as previously discussed, the explanation
for this effect is not completely understood. Thus, learning
from insight may occur mainly due to the generation effect.
Second, Auble et al., found that learning only occurs when
an initial state of incomprehension is followed by com-
prehension (Auble et al., 1979). In that sense, we hypoth-
esize that the subjective feeling of ‘‘aha!’’, indicating the
sudden change from incomprehension to comprehension,
may also occur when the solution is presented after an
unsuccessful attempt at problem-solving. However, an
‘‘aha!’’ experience during generation has been found to
enhance encoding even more than generation without
‘‘aha!’’ (Danek et al., 2013). Third, the novelty of the
sudden coherence of the solution may be another factor
facilitating learning. Novelty responses in the brain are
similar to reward responses; novelty itself can be seen as
rewarding as summarized in the novelty exploration bonus
hypothesis (Kakade & Dayan, 2002). Associative novelty
and reward are both thought to facilitate memory encoding
by means of increased dopaminergic input from the mid-
brain to the hippocampus (amongst other regions), which is
a key region of memory consolidation (e.g., Bunzeck,
Doeller, Dolan, & Du¨zel, 2012; Kumaran & Maguire,
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2009; Lisman & Grace, 2005; Otmakhova, Duzel, Deutch,
& Lisman, 2013). Thus, learning from insight may further
be based on the rewarding feeling that is based on the
suddenness of understanding a novel relationship that
previously seemed incomprehensible and is accompanied
by a positive emotional response. Lastly, evidence suggests
that detecting novel information that fits into an existing
schema can accelerate learning (Tse et al., 2007; Van
Kesteren, Ruiter, Ferna´ndez, & Henson, 2012). This was in
fact one of the original Gestalt theories on learning from
insight, i.e., that learning from insight occurs as novel
information builds a novel schema with information
already present in semantic memory. The previously per-
ceived ambiguity is suddenly resolved as the association
becomes clear (Bu¨hler, 1907; Vollmers, 2014). To use the
example of Archimedes: he suddenly realized the connec-
tion between the water level in his bath tub rising and the
mass submerged into the water, although all necessary
pieces of information were already known to him.
The subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience may reflect a specific
quality of comprehension. It is possible that the subjective
‘‘aha!’’ experience is evoked by a particularly strong nov-
elty response due to the suddenness of comprehension.
Moreover, while successfully generating a solution may
already evoke a positive emotional response, the ‘‘aha!’’
experience is additionally associated with positive affect
(Danek et al., 2013; Topolinski & Reber, 2010).2 This
positive emotional response may reflect the joy of com-
prehension or relief from the state of tension due incom-
prehension (Danek, Fraps, von Mu¨ller, Grothe, & O¨llinger,
2014). We would therefore expect that the ‘‘aha!’’ experi-
ence per se can enhance memory formation, even when the
solution is presented after failing to generate it, and when
the additional positive emotional response related to solv-
ing the problem is therefore absent.
Aims of the current study
In the current study, we investigated the extent to which the
generation of a solution and the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experi-
ence are associated with LTM encoding in regard to two
different measures of memory. We further wanted to
evaluate the qualitative difference of the sudden compre-
hension for generated and non-generated solutions, as well
as solutions understood with an ‘‘aha!’’ experience and
without. The latter was especially interesting, because most
previous studies reflect the indirect assumption that the
subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience can only occur when the
solution is generated instead of being presented, without
looking at generation and ‘‘aha!’’ in a fully crossed design.
For this purpose, we chose a pictorial problem-solving
task in which we presented so-called Mooney stimuli, that
is, black and white photos without any shades of gray
(Imamoglu, Kahnt, Koch, & Haynes, 2012; Mooney,
1957). The participants’ task during the encoding phase
was to try to figure out what was presented in the Mooney
image (see Fig. 1a). The encoding phase was incidental,
that is, participants were not told that their memory of the
Mooney images and their motifs would be tested later on.
After 1 week, memory was tested with an indirect (inci-
dental) and a direct (intentional) memory test via solving
old and new items and an old/new recognition3 memory
question, respectively (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork,
1988). Direct memory tests are more likely to tap into
voluntary, controlled retrieval, whereas indirect memory
tests are more likely to tap into more automatic, involun-
tary retrieval (Richardson-Klavehn, 2010). This paradigm
enabled us to investigate the insight components generation
and ‘‘aha!’’ and their relationships to voluntary (direct test:
old/new decision) versus more automatic retrieval pro-
cesses (indirect test: generating solutions to old items) (see
also Schott et al., 2005). We would like to emphasize that
we are investigating the relationships of generating a
solution and the feeling of ‘‘aha!’’ to long-term memory
independently. Thus, we are also testing whether a sub-
jective feeling of ‘‘aha!’’ may also occur when the solution
is presented after a failed attempt at generating a solution,
and whether this may still be related to learning.
We further incorporated an emotional valence rating of
how participants felt when comprehending the solution, in
order to compare the quality of the sudden comprehension
for generated and non-generated solutions, as well as
solutions understood with an ‘‘aha!’’ experience and
without.
Hypotheses
First of all, we hypothesized that both generation and
‘‘aha!’’ would be related to a relatively more positive
emotional valence rating than no generation and no ‘‘aha!’’.
In the case of generation accompanied by a feeling of
‘‘aha!’’, Danek et al. report feelings of joy, tension release,
as well as performance-related emotions, such as pride,
satisfaction, competitiveness (Danek et al., 2014). While
most of these aspects of a positive emotional response can
be expected for both generating a solution (with or without
2 It should be noted that Topolinski and Reber distinguish between
the nature of the positive feeling related to the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ and
generation of a solution; they explicitly state that the emotional
response begins before the assessment of the solution and that it
therefore cannot be pride.
3 To avoid misunderstandings, the term recognition is solely used to
refer to recognition memory, while we refer to recognizing the motif
of a Mooney, as in object recognition, only as identifying a Mooney
image.
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‘‘aha!’’) or for the ‘‘aha!’’ experience (with or without
generation), the performance-related emotions depend on
generation and should therefore not be related to the
‘‘aha!’’ experience. Thus, the emotional response is prob-
ably slightly more positive for generation than for aha.
In regard to the above discussed characteristics of
insight that may be related to learning (Sect. ‘‘Insight and
long-term memory formation’’), we hypothesized that later
memory performance should be better for generated solu-
tions during encoding, both for identification and recog-
nition memory performance at test, due to the generation
effect. Second, the subjective feeling of ‘‘aha!’’ should lead
to enhanced encoding, probably due to the positive emo-
tional response (Danek et al., 2013; Ludmer et al., 2011).
Third, as for the relationship between generation and
‘‘aha!’’, it is unclear what to expect of non-generated
solutions, because the relationship between the subjective
‘‘aha!’’ experience and later memory performance has thus
far only been tested for generated solutions (Bowden &
Jung-Beeman, 2003a; Danek et al., 2013). The implicit
assumption of previous studies behind the analysis of aha/
no aha responses only for generated solutions was proba-
bly that an ‘‘aha!’’ experience can only occur for self-
solved items. If so, one might expect an interaction
between the variables generation and aha in relation to
later memory performance, such that an ‘‘aha!’’ experience
is particularly important for later memory of items suc-
cessfully generated at encoding. However, it could also be
that the ‘‘aha!’’ experience can also be invoked by a pre-
sented solution after fruitless efforts of trying to solve the
problem (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b), possibly
indicating an induced representational change (Ohlsson,
1984, 1992). In this case, the relationships between
generation and ‘‘aha!’’ with later memory might be
independent.
As for the different measures of memory, we asked (1)
whether generation during encoding facilitates identifica-
tion during testing more than it facilitates recognition
memory, which would represent transfer-appropriate pro-
cessing, and (2) whether the ‘‘aha!’’ experience is more
strongly correlated with an increased probability of rec-
ognizing the item as old during testing compared to later
identification during testing, which might be expected if
‘‘aha!’’ experiences leave behind a distinctive episodic
memory trace. The results thus gave an additional oppor-
tunity to examine whether successful generation and the
‘‘aha!’’ experience during encoding involve similar or
partly distinct processes.
Fig. 1 a Encoding phase In our incidental encoding task, participants
were instructed to try to identify the motifs of the images. If
identified, the motif should be named orally. If not identified, the
original grayscale image was presented and participants should name
the motif to avoid memory differences due to the oral naming of the
image. Whether successfully solved or not, an ‘‘aha!’’/no ‘‘aha!’’
decision followed, after which participants rated their feeling during
comprehension on a 5-point scale. b Testing phase The testing phase
consisted of an indirect memory test (solving old and new items) and
a direct memory test (old/new recognition)
Psychological Research (2016) 80:1059–1074 1063
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Our data revealed that both the generation of a solution
and the ‘‘aha!’’ experience are independently accompanied
by a positive emotional response and are also indepen-
dently related to later memory. As for the different mea-
sures of memory, we found that generation at encoding had
a stronger relationship to later identification than to later
recognition memory at test, whereas the ‘‘aha!’’ experience
at encoding had a slightly larger relationship to later
recognition memory than to later identification at test.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-one healthy young adults participated in the study.
One participant had to be excluded, because of persever-
ation behavior during the aha/no aha decision. Median age
of the remaining 20 participants was 23.5 years (range
20–29), 9 participants were female, 11 male. Button
assignment to hands was counterbalanced. Participants
were included regardless of handedness, because no neural
data were acquired (17 were right-handed, one left-handed
and two bimanual by self-report). The study was approved
by the local ethics committee of the Faculty of Medicine of
the Otto-von-Guericke-University. All participants gave
written informed consent. They were informed that they
had the right to cancel the experiment at any time without
any negative personal consequences. Participation was paid
with 6 Euros/h.
Stimulus material
Mooney images were created from 212 square-cut color
photos of 137 animate and 75 inanimate objects. The
stimuli were chosen from a set of 330 Mooney images that
were originally created for the study by Imamoglu et al.
(2012). First, a subset of 257 images was selected that
contained no more than five exemplars per category and
whose motifs were relatively distinct, for example, five
different pairs of shoes (high-heels, sneakers, low boots,
high boots, sandals). The original color photographs were
further labeled and rated for the ambivalence of the motif
by four independent raters. Only those images that were
rated as non-ambivalent by the majority of raters were
included in the final sample of 212 pictures. Images were
rated as ambivalent when there was more than one central
motif, for example, a man walking with a deer on a street
instead of just a man or a deer. The labels of the raters were
used to classify the participants’ labels as correct or
incorrect. Mooney versions of the original color photos
were created by first transforming them to grayscale,
smoothing them, and finally setting all shades of gray
values below a certain threshold to white, and those above
to black (Imamoglu et al., 2012). All of the Mooney images
were set to 306 9 306 pixels. Mooney images were pre-
sented in the center of a computer screen on a black
background in a thin white frame (2 pixels width) to clearly
outline the border of the image. Of the 212 images, 159
were randomly chosen for the encoding phase and as old
items for the memory test, while the remaining 53 images
were used as new stimuli during the memory test.
Apparatus, task, and procedure
The experiment consisted of two sessions: an incidental
encoding phase during which participants tried to identify
the central motif of Mooney images, and a testing phase
1 week later that consisted of an indirect and a direct
memory test. Participants were not informed that the sec-
ond session comprised a memory test, but were told that
the second session would be relatively similar to the first
one with a few changes. This procedure was adopted
because incidental encoding has been found to increase the
generation effect (Bertsch et al., 2007). Both encoding and
testing were done at a standard desktop PC with Windows
XP in the same behavioral laboratory. Stimulus presenta-
tion and acquisition of behavioral data was controlled with
the software Presentation version 16.3 (Neurobehavioral
Systems, Berkeley, CA, USA). Stimuli were presented on a
19-in. TFT screen with 60 Hz frame rate and 1280 9 1024
pixels resolution. Responses were made with a standard
USB keyboard. During the whole experiment, the experi-
menter sat in an adjacent room and saw the same display as
the participant. Before each session, participants were
given written instructions and were asked to verbally
summarize the instructions to the experimenter to ensure
that they had understood everything as intended. Clarifi-
cation was provided by the experimenter when needed.
For the encoding phase (see Fig. 1a), participants were
asked to try to identify what was presented in each Mooney
image within a time limit of 20 s, and to indicate if and
when they had done so by pressing the space key. This task
is difficult, because the white and black patches of the
object cannot be grouped together separately from those of
the background. Immediately afterwards they were asked
to speak out their answer, for example, ‘‘dog’’. It was
emphasized that participants should only press the button
when they were ready to name the motif. When the par-
ticipant made no response before time ran out, the solution
was presented as a grayscale image for 3 s, and they had to
name the motif orally. Oral responses were made for both
generated and non-generated solutions to ensure that later
memory differences were not due to possible additional
encoding during spoken identification. As noted above, the
1064 Psychological Research (2016) 80:1059–1074
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correctness was manually scored by the experimenter
before data analysis. The solutions that were orally pro-
vided by the participants during the experiment were
written down during the experiment. This resulted in lists
that the experimenter could compare with the labels pro-
vided by the raters. After the spoken response, participants
were presented with the question ‘‘Did you have an ‘aha!’
experience?’’, to which they had to press one of two but-
tons for either ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ (left or right arrow key,
assignment counterbalanced across participants). The
question was presented until participants pressed a button.
The written instruction for the encoding phase contained a
definition of the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience, in an
attempt to ensure that the different participants would make
relatively comparable decisions about whether they had
had an ‘‘aha!’’ experience or not.
After each trial, participants were asked to rate their
answer to the question ‘‘How did you feel when you rec-
ognized the motif?’’ using a 5-point scale with a range
between -2 and 2 (Fig. 1a). Each point on the scale was
depicted using smiley figures indicating ‘‘very sad’’, ‘‘sad’’,
‘‘neutral’’, ‘‘happy’’, and ‘‘very happy’’. This rating was
applicable to both generated and presented solutions. Par-
ticipants could navigate through the smiley figures (high-
lighted with a red frame around the smiley) using the left
and right arrow keys. The selection had to be confirmed via
the space key, which ended the trial. All trials started with
a 1-s fixation cross. All stimuli were presented on a black
screen. The session consisted of 159 trials, with two short
breaks. After the session, participants filled out a ques-
tionnaire that contained the items of the novelty seeking
scale of the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI-R,
Cloninger, 1999).4
After 7 days, at approximately the same hour or, if not
possible, at least the same time of day as the encoding
phase, participants received an indirect test of their mem-
ory of the solutions of the Mooney images (i.e., whether
they could identify the object depicted), and their recog-
nition memory of the images themselves, regardless of
whether they could identify the item depicted. The initial
task in this testing phase was relatively similar to that in the
encoding phase (see Fig. 1b). Mooney images were pre-
sented for 10 s after the presentation of a fixation cross for
1 s. During that time, participants were instructed to try to
identify the item and indicate if they did so by pressing the
space button. They were explicitly instructed to ignore
whether the image seemed familiar or not, and only to try
to identify the item in the image. This was done to ensure
that subjects did not consciously try to rely on their rec-
ollection of the item and correct solution, as we were
interested in incidental memory, i.e., whether one benefits
from solving items one has encountered before regardless
of whether this is explicitly remembered. Afterwards, they
were asked to speak out their answer within 3 s while the
question ‘‘What is depicted here?’’ was presented in addi-
tion to the Mooney image. If they did not come up with an
answer or after they named their solution, the question
‘‘Was the picture old or new?’’ appeared, to which par-
ticipants were asked to respond via button press (again left
and right arrow keys, counterbalanced across participants
for ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’). Notably, the old/new decision about
the Mooney image could be made regardless of whether the
participant was able to identify it. However, we cannot
know what kind of effect the previous indirect test may
have on the direct memory test. This is a very complex
relationship. We would like to refer the interested reader to
Richardson-Klavehn and Bjork (1988).
At the end of the session, participants filled out a post-
experimental questionnaire including the question whether
they had used specific strategies to identify the Mooney
images, and if so to describe them.
Design and data analysis
We could not manipulate generation and ‘‘aha!’’ as
experimental factors but, at encoding, we expected there to
be generated and non-generated solutions as well as solu-
tions identified with and without an ‘‘aha!’’ experience.
Therefore, in our main statistical analysis, we analyzed the
potential main effects and interaction between the artificial
factors GENERATION (generated, non-generated) and
AHA (aha, no aha) with repeated-measures analyses of
variance (ANOVAs). As dependent variables, we looked at
the potential relationships between GENERATION and
AHA and the emotional response during the comprehen-
sion of the solution in the encoding phase as measured by a
5-point scale, the solution rate of old items in the later
indirect identification test, and the hit rate in the direct
recognition memory test. The 5-point scale for the emo-
tional response was treated as pseudo-metrical. We further
investigated the relationship between AHA and individual-
participant median response times (RTs) during generating
a solution at encoding, in order to test whether the sub-
jective feeling of ‘‘aha!’’ was dependent on the difficulty of
solving an item, for which we used the RTs as an indicator.
The median of the emotional response rating and genera-
tion RTs per participant was used instead of the mean: (1)
because the rating was treated as pseudo-interval-scaled,
4 The TCI’s novelty seeking scale was administered based on the
idea that high novelty seeking scores may have a positive relationship
with insight problem-solving and learning from insight. In a study by
Krebs et al. (2009) it was reported that novelty-seekers were more
responsive (in terms of the BOLD signal) to novel cues in the absence
of reward and needed less reward to boost their memory for novel
cues. We therefore hypothesized that novelty-seekers would show
better memory performance. However, no such correlation was found.
Psychological Research (2016) 80:1059–1074 1065
123
and (2) because the RTs for each participant had a typical
right-skewed distribution so that the median was a better
estimate for the peak of the distribution than the mean.
Results
Data were analyzed with SPSS version 21 (IBM, Armonk,
NY) with either related-measures t tests or repeated-mea-
sures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) where appropriate.
Results are reported as significant when p\ 0.05. As a
measure of effect size partial g2 is reported for ANOVAs
and Cohen’s d for t tests.
Dependence between AHA 3 GENERATION
First, we investigated whether there was a dependency
between the ‘‘aha!’’ experience and the generation of a
solution. We asked whether participants reported ‘‘aha!’’
experiences uniquely when they recognized the item in the
Mooney image without being presented with the solution.
We compared the frequency of ‘‘aha!’’ experiences given
that the solution was generated [P(aha|generated) = 0.47,
SD = 0.29] to the frequency of ‘‘aha!’’ experiences given
the solution was not generated [P(aha|not gener-
ated) = 0.59, SD = 0.33] using a related-measures t test.
There was no significant difference [t(19) = 1.45,
p = 0.173, Cohen’s d = 0.386], suggesting that ‘‘aha!’’
experiences did not occur more often for generated com-
pared with non-generated solutions. The descriptive dif-
ference even showed a trend for the opposite. Table 1
shows the relative number of cases of all four conditions,
e.g., of all Mooney images, 28 % of the motifs were gen-
erated with a feeling of ‘‘aha!’’, 32 % were generated
without a feeling of ‘‘aha!’’, 22 % of the motifs were not
generated but the presented solution still induced a feeling
of ‘‘aha!’’, and 18 % were neither generated nor did the
presented solution induce a feeling of ‘‘aha!’’.
Participants did not respond faster or slower to items
solved with ‘‘aha!’’ (mean = 4723 ms, SD = 3129 ms)
compared to those without ‘‘aha!’’ (mean = 4486 ms,
SD = 2059 ms), suggesting that the feeling of ‘‘aha!’’ was
not dependent on the difficulty of items, because items
more difficult to solve should have led to higher RTs.
General memory performance
To investigate whether learning occurred during the encoding
phase, we first compared the solution rate of old versus new
Mooney images at test by means of a related-measures t test.
Old items (mean = 61 %, SD = 7 %) were significantly
more often solved than new items (mean = 45 %,
SD = 9 %) [t(19) = 11.52, p\ 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.985].
As for recognition memory performance, the overall hit rate
was 63 % (SD = 12 %) and false alarm rate 22 %
(SD = 11 %); that is, even after a week the participants’
discrimination was relatively high with 41 % (SD = 11 %).
It should be noted that not all items that were recognized
as old were solved again, and vice versa. As can be seen in
Table 2, in the testing session on average participants
failed to recognize 16 % of the items as old, while they
could not solve 18 % of the old Mooney images which they
correctly identified as old.
Table 3 shows the relationship between generation during
encoding, solution rates during testing and hit rates.
Descriptively, when the solution was not generated during
encoding, items had the same likelihood to be correctly
recognized as old whether they were solved at testing or not,
but when the solution was generated during encoding, the
likelihood to be correctly recognized as old was higher when
they were also solved at testing. At the same time, the most
misses were made if the solution could not be found during
encoding and testing. This indicates that the old/new judg-
ment was probably influenced by the preceding attempts
during learning and testing at solving an item. However, the
dependency between direct and indirect measures of mem-
ory such as these is very complex and not completely
understood (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). We will
therefore refrain from discussing this finding in more detail.
The relationship between GENERATION, AHA,
and the emotional response at encoding
We were interested in whether the emotional response
related to the subjective ‘‘aha!’’/no ‘‘aha!’’ and generated/
Table 1 Percentages of Mooney images that were solved (=gener-
ated, i.e., the motif has been identified) or not solved and which did or
did not produce a subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience
% Aha No aha Sum
Generated 28 (-2.2) 32 (2.2) 60
Not generated 22 (2.7) 18 (-2.7) 40
Sum 50 50 100
Standard residuals are provided in brackets
Table 2 Distribution of solved old items and correct recognition
during the testing phase
% Solved Not solved Sum
Hit 45.7 (6.0) 17.6 (-7.6) 63.3
Miss 16.0 (-7.9) 20.7 (10.0) 36.7
Sum 61.7 38.3 100
Standard residuals are provided in brackets
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non-generated solutions differs qualitatively, and whether
the emotional response to either might depend on the other.
To analyze this relationship, we conducted a repeated-
measures ANOVA with factors GENERATION (gener-
ated, non-generated) 9 AHA(aha, no aha) and the emo-
tional response rating as a dependent variable. Both
GENERATION [F(1, 19) = 48.6, p B 0.001, g2 = 0.719]
and AHA [F(1, 19) = 60.26, p B 0.001, g2 = 0.760] had
significant main effects on the emotional response, whereas
there was no interaction, as can be seen in Fig. 2. Gener-
ated solutions had an overall mean positive rating of 0.63
(SD = 0.07) while non-generated solutions were almost
rated as neutral with a mean of 0.08 (SD = 0.10). Solu-
tions inducing a subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience were also
rated more positively (overall mean = 0.79, SD = 0.09)
than those without aha (overall mean = -0.08,
SD = 0.10). The absence of an interaction supports the
idea that the subjective feeling of ‘‘aha!’’ does not depend
on being proud for having solved the item (Topolinski &
Reber, 2010).
The relationship between GENERATION, AHA,
and solving old items at testing
GENERATION and AHA at encoding showed a similar
relationship with our indirect memory performance
measure, that is, the solution rate of old items, as they had
with the emotional response (see Fig. 3a). The generation
of a solution during encoding was associated with a higher
solution rate during testing (overall mean = 0.78,
SD = 0.02) than when the solution was presented (overall
mean = 0.41, SD = 0.03) [F(1, 19) = 136.53, p B 0.001,
g2 = 0.878]. Regardless of GENERATION, when the
solution was understood with a feeling of ‘‘aha!’’ at
encoding, solution rate during testing was higher (overall
mean = 0.64, SD = 0.03) than when it was not accom-
panied by an ‘‘aha!’’ (overall mean = 0.54, SD = 0.04)
[F(1, 19) = 4.66, p = 0.044, g2 = 0.197]. As in the pre-
vious analysis, there was no interaction. Note that solution
rates for old items were only higher than for new items
when the solution was generated during encoding. As this
might suggest that only easy items were solved repeatedly,
we tested the dependency between item difficulty and
learning (see Sect. ‘‘Item difficulty, learning, and ‘‘aha!’’’’).
The relationship between GENERATION, AHA,
and recognition memory performance
As can be seen in Fig. 3b, GENERATION and AHA also
had independent relationships with the hit rate during the
recognition memory test, with generated solutions and non-
generated (presented) solutions that induced an ‘‘aha!’’
Table 3 Distribution of solved
old items and correct
recognition during the testing
phase split for both levels of the
variable GENERATION
% Generated (encoding) Not generated (encoding)
Solved (testing) Not solved (testing) Solved (testing) Not solved (testing)
Hit 59.1 11.7 25.1 26.7
Miss 19.6 9.6 10.5 37.6
Fig. 2 Relationship of
GENERATION and AHA with
the emotional response.
Successful generation and the
subjective ‘‘aha!’’ response
were independently associated
with a relatively more positive
rating than no generation and no
‘‘aha!’’
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experience being associated with a higher later recognition
rate. The main effect of GENERATION was significant
with F(1, 19) = 16.50, p = 0.001, g2 = 0.465 (see
Fig. 3b). Items whose solution could be generated during
encoding were significantly more often correctly recog-
nized as old (overall mean = 0.71, SD = 0.03) than items
whose solution was presented (overall mean = 0.57,
SD = 0.04). The relationship between GENERATION and
recognition memory performance was weaker than that of
GENERATION and later solution rates during testing (cf.
Fig. 3a). As for the AHA factor, items that induced an
‘‘aha!’’ experience during encoding were associated with a
significantly higher recognition rate (overall mean = 0.67,
SD = 0.03) than those which did not induce an ‘‘aha!’’
(overall mean = 0.61, SD = 0.04) [F(1, 19) = 5.95,
p = 0.025, g2 = 0.238]. As with the emotional response
and solution rates during testing, there was no interaction.
All in all, the pattern of relationships between the factors
GENERATION, AHA, and the measures of the emotional
response, solution rate of old items, and recognition
memory performance was very consistent.
Comparison between both measures of memory,
GENERATION, and AHA
To test our hypotheses that generation may have a stronger
relationship to solving old items at test, while the ‘‘aha!’’
experience might have a stronger relationship to recog-
nizing old items, we computed a 2 9 2 repeated-measures
ANOVA with factors TEST (solving old items, recognition
memory) and INSIGHT_ASPECT (generation, aha). As a
dependent variable, we compared the differences between
generated minus non-generated memory performances
(generation effect) and aha minus no aha memory perfor-
mances (aha effect) in both our direct and indirect mea-
sures of memory. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of
TEST [F(1, 19) = 22.20, p\ 0.001, g2 = 0.539], a main
effect of INSIGHT_ASPECT [F(1, 19) = 13.55,
p = 0.002, g2 = 0.416], and an interaction [F(1,
19) = 14.09, p = 0.001, g2 = 0.426]. To resolve the
interaction, we compared the generation effect and the aha
effect for solving old items vs. recognizing old items
during test separately with related-measures t tests. The
t test for the generation effect revealed a significantly
higher generation effect for solving old items
(mean = 0.36, SD = 0.14) in comparison to recognizing
old items (mean = 0.13, SD = 0.15) during test
[t(19) = 7.27, p\ 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.585]. As for the
aha effect, we found no significant difference between
solving old items (mean = 0.10, SD = 0.21) and recog-
nizing old items (mean = 0.07, SD = 0.12) during test
[t(19)\ 1, p[ 0.4, Cohen’s d = 0.175]. We further tested
whether the generation effect or the aha effect was larger in
solving old items and recognizing old items during test.
Here we found that the generation effect was significantly
higher than the aha effect in solving old items during
testing [t(19) = 4.40, p\ 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.457],
whereas—although descriptively double the size—only
showing a trend towards significance in recognizing old
items [t(19) = 1.54, p = 0.141, Cohen’s d = 0.442].
To summarize, generation had a considerably stronger
relationship than the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience to
solving old items during testing. Moreover, generation had
a stronger relationship with solving old items during testing
than with recognition memory performance, while the
relationship of the ‘‘aha!’’ experience to later memory was
comparable in both tests.
Item difficulty, learning, and ‘‘aha!’’
To investigate whether difficult items, that is, items that
were solved with higher RTs or items solved less
Fig. 3 Relationship of GENERATION and AHA to memory perfor-
mance. a Solution rate of new items and old items split for generation
and ‘‘aha!’’ during encoding. b Recognition memory performance,
i.e., false alarm rate and hit rate split for generation and ‘‘aha!’’ during
encoding. Generation and ‘‘aha!’’ were associated with higher
solution rates of old items and higher hit rates. For both measures
of memory these relationships were independent. Error bars represent
95 % confidence intervals, for within-subjects design corrected
according to Masson and Loftus (2003)
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frequently, induced ‘‘aha!’’ experiences more often, we
aggregated the data split for the 212 items across the 20
participants. One-tailed Pearson correlation analyses were
executed to analyze the relationship between median RTs
and ‘‘aha!’’ frequency across items (i.e., median RT across
subjects per item, relative number of participants who rated
‘‘aha!’’ per item) as well as between the frequency of
generated solutions and frequency of ‘‘aha!’’ experiences.
As can be seen in Fig. 4a, there was no correlation between
median RT and percent ‘‘aha!’’ [N = 210 due to 2 items
that were solved by none of the participants, r = 0.003].
There was a moderate negative correlation between the
generation rate and the ‘‘aha!’’ rate during encoding
[N = 212, r = -0.128, p = 0.031], that is, higher ‘‘aha!’’
rates correlated with lower generation rates. This result
should, however, be interpreted with caution due to con-
siderable ceiling effects: some items could be solved by all
participants as can be seen in Fig. 4b.
As it could potentially have been the case that the learning
effect in the indirect test described previously is only due the
repeated generation of easy items, and thus not real learning,
we split items into difficult and easy items based on the median
of the generation rate (median = 0.60), that is, how many
participants could solve an item when it was presented during
encoding. As learning rate we subtracted the generation rate of
items during test when they were new from when they were
old, and compared the learning rate for difficult and easy items
(see Fig. 5). Both categories showed a significant learning
effect of 0.16 [SD = 0.21; t(104) = 7.84, p\ 0.001] for
difficult and 0.13 [SD = 0.23; t(106) = 5.68, p\ 0.001] for
easy items when tested with a one-sample t test against 0.
Importantly, there was no significant difference between the
learning rate for difficult and easy items [independent-sample
t(210) = 0.984, p = 0.326, Cohen’s d = 0.136], corrobo-
rating that the generation during encoding had the same
beneficial learning effect for difficult and easy items.
Descriptively, learning was even higher for difficult items.
Discussion
In this study, we used a new paradigm that enabled us to
investigate generation, that is, self-solved vs. presented
solutions, and the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience in regard to
Fig. 4 Relationship between item difficulty and ‘‘aha!’’ frequency.
a RT for generated items 9 aha rate. The rate of ‘‘aha!’’ responses did
not correlate with RTs for generated solutions. b Generation
rate 9 aha rate. The ‘‘aha!’’ rate did correlate negatively with the
generation rate during testing (r = -0.128). However, considerable
ceiling effects, as visible in b, show that the relationship should be
interpreted with caution
Fig. 5 Learning effect for easy and difficult items as measured by the
generation rate at test for old minus new items. There was no
significant difference in the size of the learning effect for difficult
compared to easy items
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later LTM performance, to gain a better understanding of
the different components of insight that may have a ben-
eficial effect on encoding. For this purpose, we used a
pictorial insight paradigm in which participants were asked
to identify motifs of Mooney images and to rate their
subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experiences (Imamoglu et al., 2012;
Mooney, 1957).
Generation and ‘‘Aha!’’ are independently related
to later memory performance
Our findings support the idea that ‘‘aha!’’ experiences as
well as the successful generation of an insight solution are
accompanied by a positive feeling (Fig. 2). In addition, the
emotional response towards the feeling of ‘‘aha!’’ was
independent of the emotional response towards the gener-
ation of the solution. Thus, although generation with
‘‘aha!’’ was accompanied by the most positive feeling, the
positive feeling was not dependent on the joint occurrence
of both; the effect is additive. In line with Sternberg’s
suggestion of interpreting an additive effect as reflecting
different (stages of) cognitive processes (Sternberg, 1969),
this result may indicate that different aspects that con-
tribute to the emotional valence rating are associated with
the generation of a solution and the subjective ‘‘aha!’’
experience. This interpretation would also be in line with
Topolinski and Reber who propose that the subjective
‘‘aha!’’ experience reflects something other than pride, as
which one may interpret the positive emotional response
related to generation (Topolinski & Reber, 2010).
We hypothesized that both generation and ‘‘aha!’’ would
enhance LTM encoding on the one hand due to the
rewarding, positive emotional response that accompanies
novel understanding or successful generation, and on the
other hand, because the generation of a solution leads to a
better integration of the information into memory, possibly
due to high schema-consistency. Furthermore, the ‘‘aha!’’
experience may reflect that the novel perception of the
Mooney as an object instead of a random composition of
black and white blotches came suddenly and was especially
strong, clear, and convincing, thereby leaving a stronger
memory trace (Ludmer et al., 2011). According to previous
studies that looked only at generated solutions that were
either accompanied by an ‘‘aha!’’ or not, but not at non-
generated solutions (e.g., Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003a;
Danek et al., 2013), one could have expected that the
subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience only affects behavior when
solutions were generated. Whether this is actually the case
has not been tested in any studies the authors are aware of.
Here, our data suggest that this is not the case. Not only did
generation and ‘‘aha!’’ have independent relationships to
the emotional response, we also found that both generation
and the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experience were independently
related to memory performance in our indirect memory test
of solving old items, as well as in our direct old/new
recognition memory test. Thus, ‘‘aha!’’ and generation
seem to be independently related to later memory besides
being independently associated with emotional valence.
Regarding our main question at hand, that is, which
components of insight contribute in which way to a bene-
ficial effect on LTM encoding, our results suggest that it is
the generation effect which has the strongest relation to
later memory performance, whereas the relationship
between ‘‘aha!’’ and later memory is relatively weak
(Fig. 3). A previous study had already shown that gener-
ation accompanied by the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ is associated
with better later memory performance than generation
without ‘‘aha!’’ (Danek et al., 2013). Danek et al. found
that memory for solutions of magic tricks was enhanced for
those solutions which were generated with ‘‘aha!’’ com-
pared to those generated without ‘‘aha!’’ in the learning
phase. In the current study, because generation and ‘‘aha!’’
had additive relationships with later memory, generation
accompanied by an ‘‘aha!’’ experience indeed showed the
best memory performance, but not in the interactive way
one might expect. Our findings do corroborate the rela-
tionship of the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ with enhanced memory
for the solution. In addition, our study shows that the
subjective ‘‘aha!’’ may even occur when the solution is
presented after a failed attempt at generation and that this
can also enhance later memory for the solution.
Regarding our hypotheses that generation may have a
stronger relationship with our indirect memory test (solving
old items during testing), which measured more automatic
retrieval processes, while ‘‘aha!’’ may have a stronger rela-
tionship with our direct memory test (recognition memory
performance), which measured more voluntary, conscious
retrieval, than with our indirect memory test, we found sup-
port for the first, but none for the latter. Given that our indirect
memory test was essentially the same as our encoding task,
transfer-appropriate processing would easily explain the
difference between the generation effect on solving old items
vs. correctly recognizing old items (Morris et al., 1977). As
Bowers already suggested, during the search process for a
solution, spreading activation may activate semantic memory
content potentially relevant for the solution (Bowers et al.,
1990; Collins & Loftus, 1975). If generation fails, it may be
due to the automatically activated information leading to an
impasse that could not be overcome. If the testing situation
then activates the neural pattern similar to the one at encod-
ing, this is only beneficial for successful generation, but not
necessarily for failed generation. However, transfer-appro-
priate processing may not explain the generation effect per se,
as discussed in the Introduction. Moreover, the recognition
memory task always followed the generation task during
testing, hence it may well be that the previous engagement
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with the items enhanced recognition memory performance
more for those items for which participants had already failed
to generate the solution during encoding. This is also sup-
ported by the higher hit rate for old items that were not solved
during testing and whose solution was also not generated
during encoding compared to those items for which genera-
tion during encoding was successful (see Table 3).
Taken together, it seems as though the subjective ‘‘aha!’’
experience was only an additive component to the larger
generation effect, both in regard to later memory and the
emotional response. The ‘‘aha!’’ experience itself has a
comparably weak relationship to later memory performance.
The finding that its relationship to later memory is statistically
comparable for solving old items during testing and recog-
nizing old items may suggest that it influences recollection,
which is thought to reflect the retrieval of qualitative infor-
mation about an episode more than familiarity, a more global
measure of memory strength (Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, &
Rugg, 2005; Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 2010). This
interpretation is also supported by the emotional response.
These findings suggest that it is important that learners try
to solve problems on their own, because even if they are not
able to come up with the solution themselves, when the
revealed solution is highly surprising and compelling, this
might still enhance learning. In regard to education, our data
would support the importance of problem-based learning
(Loyens, Kirschner, & Paas, 2012), that is, the importance of
learners to engage in a creative problem-solving process.
Overlaps and differences with previous studies
How do our results further our understanding of learning
from insight? Previous studies on insight and learning have
shown that generating solutions to problems that do not
readily come to mind, but which warrant an ‘‘effort towards
understanding’’, i.e., comprehension which is preceded by
a state of incomprehension, enhance later memory for the
solution (Auble et al., 1979; Mednick, 1962; Wills, Soraci,
Chechile, & Taylor, 2000). For example, by comparing
sentences that are not immediately comprehensible without
a cue with sentences that are comprehensible, because the
cue word is integrated into the sentence (Auble et al.,
1979), Auble and colleagues realized a paradigm that is
highly identical with the typical generation effect manip-
ulation, that is, generate versus read conditions (Slamecka
& Graf, 1978).5 It is difficult to say whether the generation
effect for insight problems is special. It has been proposed
that this specific type of generation effect is different from
the well-known generation effect of the main corpus of
studies on this effect reported in the long-term memory
literature (Wills et al., 2000). Wills and colleagues rea-
soned that the typical generation studies try to make the
generation condition very easy to reach a 100 % solution
rate and to avoid item selection effects, that is only easy
items being solved (e.g., Gardiner, Java, & Richardson-
Klavehn, 1996). However, from this one could infer that
the generation effect for ‘‘insight’’ problems is just a gen-
eration effect for relatively difficult problems. On the other
hand, it could be that the particular nature of insight
problem-solving benefits learning even more than analyti-
cal problem solving.
Support for the notion that not only generation per se,
but generating the solution in a very specific way, namely
accompanied by a feeling of ‘‘aha!’’, comes from Danek
et al. (2013). Based on self-reports of the participants, they
distinguished between items solved with an ‘‘aha!’’ expe-
rience—a sudden realization of the solution of which one is
very confident—and more analytically—a gradual and
stepwise discovery of the solution of which one is less
confident. Thus, in contrast to Bowden and Jung-Beeman
(2003a) they did not just assume that the no ‘‘aha!’’
response reflects analytical problem-solving, but specifi-
cally defined it in this way for the participants. They found
that solving problems with ‘‘aha!’’ led to better memory
encoding than solving without ‘‘aha!’’. This result suggests
that learning from insight is not just supported by the
generation effect, but by a very specific solution path that is
mostly unconscious (Reber, Ruch-Monachon, & Perrig,
2007). However, our data suggest that this solution must
not necessarily be found by the participants themselves. It
seems that it suffices that participants attempt to solve a
problem, followed by experiencing the revealed solution
and sudden comprehension with an ‘‘aha!’’ experience, as
described previously.
Theoretical considerations on learning from insight
By what means can both the generation of a solution and
the experience of an ‘‘aha!’’, i.e., suddenness of under-
standing and being convinced of the truth of the solution,
enhance learning? In the Introduction, besides the potential
explanations for the classical generation effect, we con-
sidered the following mechanisms: novelty, intrinsic
reward, and schema-consistency. Our results support the
idea that intrinsic reward and novelty are one of the reasons
that lead to better memory, since both generation and the
‘‘aha!’’ experience are, in accordance with the novelty
exploration bonus hypothesis (Kakade & Dayan, 2002),
associated with a relatively more positive emotional
response and better memory. Evidence suggests that
5 It should be noted that the generation effect literature makes a
distinction between a read condition in which one does not have the
chance to generate in contrast to a fail-to-generate condition. Both
also have different effects on later memory, with fail-to-generate
scoring between read and generation, although fail-to-generate and
read are both less beneficial to memory than successful generation.
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reward enhances hippocampal encoding by means of
dopaminergic projections from the midbrain (Kumaran &
Maguire, 2009; Lisman & Grace, 2005). Our results sup-
port the idea that insight enhances learning partially by
means of being an intrinsic reward.
Generating the solution indicates that the visual infor-
mation of the Mooney image has been mentally reorga-
nized (Mayer, 1995). Evidence even suggests that a literal
representational change occurred: the neural representation
of the Mooney image now resembles that of the grayscale
image more than that of the Mooney image before com-
prehension (Hsieh, Vul, & Kanwisher, 2010). Another
study by Imamoglu et al. suggests that feed-forward input
from the prefrontal cortex influences object recognition
after the motif of the Mooney image has been identified
(Imamoglu et al., 2012). Both findings can be interpreted as
evidence for the novel information (Mooney image) being
associated with semantic knowledge which changes the
way the Mooney image is perceived from mere black and
white blotches to a coherent figure. Generating the solution
may therefore enhance encoding by means of detecting
schema-consistency which has been reported to accelerate
or even shortcut hippocampal encoding (Tse et al., 2011;
Van Kesteren et al., 2013).
Schema-consistency may not only be detected during
successful generation, but may also be indicated when
participants report an ‘‘aha!’’ experience for presented
solutions after failed generation. However, they did not
reach the representational change that led to the detection
of schema-consistency themselves which could explain
why generation is superior to the ‘‘aha!’’ experience in
regard to later memory performance. It is conceivable that
the ‘‘aha!’’ experience for non-generated solutions occurs
mainly for items whose solution was close to surfacing into
consciousness, similar to the ‘‘incomplete generation’’
explanation of Slamecka and Fevreiski (1983) (they
reported that later memory for the solution shows the
pattern generate B fail-to-generate\ read, whereby the
read and fail-to-generate condition differ in that subjects
did not have the chance to solve the item in the read
condition, but were presented with the solution immedi-
ately). In line with Bowers’ two-stage model of intuition
(Bowers et al., 1990), the first stage of forming an intuitive
feeling of coherence may have been reached, but not the
surfacing of a hypothesis about the solution into con-
sciousness (=insight). The last step would then be induced
by the presentation of the solution after the time for solving
the item ran out. Unfortunately, we have no index of the
participants’ closeness to the solution to evaluate the
hypothesis that the ‘‘aha!’’ experience in failed generation
reflects an incomplete representational change that is
accelerated by the presented solution. We are currently
conducting a study on the relationship between generation,
‘‘aha!’’, and the feeling-of-warmth to later memory to
illuminate this matter.
Conclusion
The current study revealed that successful generation and the
subjective feeling of ‘‘aha!’’ were independently beneficially
related to LTM encoding as assessed by two different types of
memory tests. This is in contrast to the hypothesis that ‘‘aha!’’
experiences would especially be beneficially related to LTM
formation when accompanying successful generation—as
might be expected intuitively and based on prior literature.
The results suggest, by contrast, that a sudden revelation of
the solution that induces a comparable feeling to the ‘‘aha!’’
for self-solved items can also be beneficial for LTM encod-
ing, even though encoding lacks the benefit of generation
itself. This could possibly be due to the ‘‘aha!’’ experience for
presented solutions indicating incomplete representational
change. Studies investigating insight problem-solving, and
especially the few of them which assessed the impact of
insight on LTM encoding, have so far failed to take into
account both factors at the same time in a fully crossed
manner, thereby overlooking the possible effect the ‘‘aha!’’
experience can have even when the solution is presented after
failed attempts to solve an insight problem. We suggest that
future studies should always take both factors into account.
The result that generation and the subjective ‘‘aha!’’ experi-
ence are independently related to later memory may further
suggest that they affect the encoding process on different
processing levels (Richardson-Klavehn, 2010; Sternberg,
1969). Electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies could
therefore tackle this hypothesis by investigating potential
differences in neural correlates of those processes.
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